The lesson monetary policy needs to learn

It seemed obvious to write a post about the Peterson Institute’s recent conference on ‘Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy’, but nowadays I find it more efficient to let Martin Sandbu do the job. We agree most of the time, and he does these things better than I do. It allows me to write something only in the unlikely event that I disagree, or if I want to take the discussion further.

I only have one quibble with Martin’s column yesterday. I think Bernanke’s suggestion that following a large recession (where interest rates hit their lower bound) central banks revert to a temporary price level target is rather more than the tweak he suggests. In addition, as Tony Yates pointed out, level of NGDP targets do not resolve the asymmetry problem that Bernanke’s suggestion is designed to address.

I also thought I could illustrate Martin’s final point that “admitting one has got things badly wrong is a prerequisite for doing better” by looking at some numbers. If we look at consumer prices, average inflation between 2009 and 2016 was 1.1% in the Euro area, 1.4% in the US and 2.2% in the UK. The UK was a failure too: average consumer price inflation should have been higher than 2.2%, because we had a large VAT hike and depreciation that monetary policy rightly saw through. If we look at GDP deflators we get a clearer picture, with 1.0%, 1.5% and 1.6% for the EZ, US and UK respectively.

You might think errors of that size are not too bad, and anyway what is wrong with inflation being too low. You would be wrong because in a recovery period these errors represent lost resources that, as the Phillips curve appears to be currently so flat, could be considerable. Or in other words the recovery could have been a lot faster, and interest rates could now be well off the lower bound everywhere, if policy had been more expansionary.

What I really wanted to add to Martin’s discussion was to suggest the main problem with monetary policy over this period, particularly in the UK and the Eurozone. It is not, in my view, the failure to adopt a levels target, or even the ECB raising rates in 2011 (although that was a serious and costly mistake). In 2009, when central banks would have liked to stimulate further but felt that interest rates were at their lower bound, they should have issued a statement that went something like this:

“We have lost our main instrument for controlling the economy. There are other instruments we could use, but their impact is largely unknown, so they are completely unreliable. There is a much superior way of stimulating the economy in this situation, and that is fiscal policy, but of course it remains the government’s prerogative whether it wishes to use that instrument. Until we think the economy has recovered sufficiently to raise interest rates, the economy is no longer under our control.”

I am not suggesting QE did not have a significant positive impact on the economy. But its use allowed governments to imagine that ending the recession was not their responsibility, and that what I call the Consensus Assignment was still working. It was not: QE was one of the most unreliable policy instruments imaginable.

The criticism that this would involve the central bank exceeding its remit and telling politicians what to do is misplaced. Members of the ECB spent much of the time telling politicians the opposite, Mervyn King did the same in a more discreet way, while Ben Bernanke eventually said in essence something milder than the above. Under the Consensus Assignment we have invested central banks with the task of managing the economy because we think interest rates are a better tool than fiscal policy. As such it is beholden on them to tell us when they can no longer do the job better than government.

A better criticism is that a statement of that kind would not have made any difference, and we could spend hours discussing that. But this is about the future, and who knows what the political circumstances will be then. It is important that governments acknowledge that the Consensus Assignment no longer works if central banks believe there is a lower bound for interest rates, and this has to start by central banks admitting this. Economists like Paul Krugman, Brad DeLong and myself have been saying these things for so long and so often, but I think central banks still have problems fully accepting what this means for them.       

Why German wages need to rise

An interesting disagreement occurred this week between Martin Sandbu and the Economist, which prompted a subsequent letter from Philippe Legrain (see also Martin again here). The key issue is whether the German current account surplus, which has steadily risen from a small deficit in 2000 to a large surplus of over 8% of GDP, is a problem or more particularly a drag on global growth.

To assess whether the surplus is a problem, it is helpful to discuss a key reason why it arose. I have talked about this in detail many times before, and a similar story has been told by one of the five members of Germany’s Council of Economic Experts, Peter Bofinger. A short summary is that from the moment the Eurozone was born Germany allowed wages to increase at a level that was inconsistent with the EZ inflation target of ‘just below 2%’. We can see this clearly in the following chart.

Relative unit labour costs, source OECD Economic Outlook, 2000=100

The blue line shows German unit labour costs relative to its competitors compared to the same for the Euro area average. Obviously Germany is part of that average, so this line reduces the extent of any competitiveness divergence between Germany and other union partners. By keeping wage inflation low from 2000 to 2009, Germany steadily gained a competitive advantage over other Eurozone countries.

At the time most people focused on the excessive inflation in the periphery. But as the red line shows, this was only half the story, because wage inflation was too low in Germany compared to everyone else. This growing competitive advantage was bound to lead to growing current account surpluses.

However that in itself is not enough to say there is a problem, for two related reasons. First, perhaps Germany entered the Eurozone at an uncompetitive exchange rate, so the chart above just shows a correction to that. Second, perhaps Germany needs to be this competitive because the private sector wants to save more than it invests and therefore to buy foreign assets.

There are good reasons, mainly to do with an ageing population, why the second point might be true. (If it was also true in 2000, the first point could also be true.) It makes sense on demographic grounds for Germany to run a current account surplus. The key issue is how big a surplus. Over 8% of GDP is huge, and I have always thought that it was much too big to simply represent the underlying preferences of German savers.

I’m glad to see the IMF agrees. It suggests that a current account surplus of between 2.5% to 5.5% represents a medium term equilibrium. That would suggest that the competitiveness correction that started in 2009 has still got some way to go. Why is it taking so long? This confuses some into believing that the 8% surplus must represent some kind of medium term equilibrium, because surely disequilibrium caused by price and wage rigidities should have unwound by now. The answer to that can also be found in an argument that I and others put forward a few years ago.

For this competitiveness imbalance to unwind, we need either high wage growth in Germany, low wage growth in the rest of the Eurozone, or both. Given how low inflation is on average in the Eurozone, getting below average wage inflation outside Germany is very difficult. The reluctance of firms to impose wage cuts, or workers to accept them, is well known. As a result, the unwinding of competitiveness imbalances in the Eurozone was always going to be slow if the Eurozone was still recovering from its fiscal and monetary policy induced recession and therefore Eurozone average inflation was low. [1]

In that sense German current account surpluses on their current scale are a symptom of two underlying problems: a successful attempt by Germany to undercut other Eurozone members before the GFC, and current low inflation in the Eurozone. To the extent that Germany can make up for their past mistakes by encouraging higher German wages (either directly, or indirectly through an expansionary fiscal policy) they should. Not only would that speed adjustment, but it would also discourage a culture within Germany that says it is generally legitimate to undercut other Eurozone members through low wage increases. [2]

From this perspective, does that mean that the current excess surpluses in Germany are a drag on global growth? Only in a very indirect way. If higher German wages, or the means used to achieve them, boosted demand and output in Germany then this would help global growth. (Remember that ECB interest rates are stuck at their lower bound, so there will be little monetary offset to any demand boost.) The important point is that this demand boost is not so that Germany can help out the world or other union members, but because Germany should do what it can to correct a problem of its own making.

[1] Resistance to nominal wage cuts becomes a much more powerful argument for a higher inflation target in a monetary union where asymmetries mean equilibrium exchange rates are likely to change over time.

[2] The rule in a currency union is very simple. Once we have achieved a competitiveness equilibrium, nominal wages should rise by 2% (the inflation target) more than underlying national productivity. I frequently get comments along the lines that setting wages lower than this improves the competitiveness of the Eurozone as a whole. This is incorrect, because if all union members moderate their wages in a similar fashion EZ inflation would fall, prompting a monetary stimulus to bring inflation back to 2% and wage inflation back to 2% plus productivity growth.    

Underestimating the impact of austerity

There have been many ideas put forward to explain the low growth in UK productivity, but among mainstream accounts the impact of austerity is not usually high up on the list of possibilities. I have talked before about what I call an ‘innovations gap’, and how the UK is currently suffering a particularly large innovations gap. The idea of an innovations gap can link inadequate demand, like austerity, to low productivity growth.

Let me use a very simple example to explain how an innovations gap can arise after a deep recession followed by austerity. Assume that improvements in technology and production techniques are constantly taking place, or being learnt from other firms/countries, but they need new investment to put them in place. This is what economists call embodied technical progress.

Imagine a firm where demand is not increasing. Will that firm invest to become more productive? Only if the additional profits it can make as a result of investing (suitably discounted) is greater than the cost of the investment. For this firm we therefore need quite a big innovation gap before it is worth its while to undertake investment and before its productivity increases.

Now imagine that demand increases. The firm now has to undertake some additional investment to increase its output. It makes sense to invest in techniques that embody the latest technology. The increase in demand leads to both higher investment (what economists call the ‘accelerator’) and higher productivity.

In a normal recovery from a recession, demand recovers rapidly (growth easily exceeds past trends), leading firms to invest in the latest technology. Any innovations gap that might have opened up in the recession is quickly closed. In contrast, a very slow recovery caused by austerity will reduce the need for investment, allowing a large innovations gap to open up.

This idea fits in with some recent work which suggests that productivity growth in ‘frontier’ firms (firms that already have relatively high productivity) has not slowed, and a gap has opened up between these frontier firms and laggards. (See also here.) This would make sense if the frontier firms are growing (because they are the most productive) but the laggard firms are not. Growing firms need to invest to expand, but stagnant firms are not expanding.

The same model could also suggest how wage led productivity growth could occur (see Ben Chu here for example). As most innovations are likely to be labour saving, then higher wages can increase the profits that come from any particular investment, without necessarily increasing the cost of that investment. So an increase in wages caused by an increase in the minimum wage, for example, could increase investment and therefore increase productivity. The other side of that coin is that the period of stagnant wage growth we have had since the recession provided no incentive for firms to invest in higher productivity techniques.

I doubt that this story explains more than a part of the UK’s productivity gap. In the UK investment in plant and machinery fell sharply in the recession, and has not yet recovered to pre-recession levels, but its decline is unlikely to be enough to explain a productivity standstill. (For an account of some other key factors that could explain the UK productivity puzzle, see here.) But if it explains even a little, it makes austerity a lot more costly.

One way of describing what I’m saying is that austerity influences supply as well as demand. You could say austerity ignores the accelerator as well as the multiplier, which is cute but does not capture the idea of embodied technical progress which is crucial to this argument. It is why it is always best to run a high pressure economy (see Martin Sandbu here who links to an interview between Jared Bernstein and Josh Bivens).

As I explain here, I do not use austerity as just another name for any fiscal consolidation, or fiscal consolidation involving cuts to spending. Fiscal consolidation need not reduce output for the aggregate economy if monetary policy is able to offset its impact. But if interest rates are at their lower bound, as they are once again in the UK [1], fiscal consolidation will reduce output and lead to another needless waste of resources. Since Brexit we have a second period of UK austerity. In assessing how costly this will be, we need to look not just at whether it creates a negative output gap, but also how it creates an innovations gap that reduces productivity.

[1] We know this, because the Bank is increasing the amount of QE.

The Output Gap and the Innovations Gap

A major objection to my suggestion that the UK is in an self-fulfilling expectations led recession is that measures of the output gap suggest that gap is near zero. What I want to argue here is that measures of the output gap ignore what I will call the innovations gap, and the innovations gap could indicate that demand expansion would not be inflationary.

The output gap is the difference between actual output and trend output, where trend output is the level of output at which inflation is stable. The OBR are the output gap kings. They have a composite measure, which Ben Chu shows here, but this is derived from many different measures, shown in the OBR’s latest forecast on page 36. The OBR also show (p38) that estimates produced by other organisations vary widely. Most measures of the output gap can be categorised into four kinds.

1. Time series filters. These, at their most simple, just smooth the data on actual output to produce the measure of trend output that is one half of the output gap. These have no economic content and therefore tell us almost nothing.
   
   
2. Production function estimates. These combine measures of the labour force with the capital stock to give potential output: the level of output that could be produced if all factors of production were fully utilised. The major problem with these measures is that they have no measure of technology: how much can be produced by capital and labour. What is generally done is to use time series methods to estimate this, which takes us back to the smoothing idea. As a result, measures produced by the IMF and OECD suggest the years before the recession were a huge boom, which is implausible given other evidence we have.
   
   
3. Labour market measures, like unemployment or participation. There are of course many problems in knowing what the non-inflationary level of these variables are.
   
   
4. Firm surveys. These ask questions like are you producing at normal levels of capacity utilisation. The answer you get right now is that firms are indeed working close to normal capacity.
   
   

With these definitions in mind, what we have to ask is do any of these measures tell us what we really want to know, which is would firms react to increases in demand by raising prices and wages. I want to argue that they may not after an economy has grown at rates well below previous trends for a while. The reason is that, in these circumstances, firms may know that their current production methods are outdated, too labour intensive and inefficient, but at current levels of demand it is not worth them investing in new techniques. However if demand did increase, rather than raise prices to choke off that new demand, it would be more profitable to investment in new equipment to meet that additional demand. An expansion in demand would not be inflationary because firms would not raise their prices. In addition, because these new techniques were labour saving, there would be no inflationary pressure in the labour market (although real wages would rise because productivity increased).

We can tell the following story about the UK economy. At the peak of the recession, unemployment was high and firms had spare capacity. All the output gap measures said the output gap was large. What would normally happen next is that output would start recovering rapidly at above trend rates of growth, leading to a pickup in investment and new techniques being embodied in new production. But that didn’t happen in the UK, mainly because austerity held back demand and interest rates couldn’t go negative. 

When demand did finally begin to expand at a modest rate in 2013, cautious firms decided to meet that additional demand not through new investment but by using existing spare capacity. During 2013 and 2014 employment increased and the output gap fell, but productivity was stagnant because most firms were not investing in new techniques. (The market leaders were, because being market leaders they were expanding more rapidly and investing. So as Martin Sandbu has discussed, the UK productivity puzzle is associated with the average firm, not leading firms.)

This meant that by 2015, unemployment had fallen to more normal levels, and firms no longer had spare capacity. All this had been achieved with stagnant productivity growth, because most firms had stopped investing in new innovations. It was not because those innovations had stopped being made. So the output gap had been replaced by an innovations gap, with most firms using out of date production techniques that are too labour intensive.

If this story is right, we have become locked in a self-fulfilling low growth trap. Firms will not invest because they see recent slow growth continuing. They are right, because policymakers, looking at the output gap rather than the innovation gap, are doing nothing to expand demand for fear of inflation, or worse still because of mistaken worries about government debt. I do not know if this story is right, but it seems to me that the cost in lost output if it is right is so great that it is foolish to ignore this possibility.   

The academic consensus on austerity solidifies, but policymakers go their own sweet way

With yet another study showing how damaging austerity can be, you would think that at some point some politicians would eventually get it. This tepid economic recovery has been a huge vindication of Keynesian economics, which also happens to be mainstream economics. The textbooks and state of the art macroeconomics said cutting public spending while interest rates were stuck at their lower bound was a very bad idea. And sure enough pretty well every ex post analysis of this period finds that it was. It is particularly ironic that at a time when countless articles have appeared about the ‘crisis in economics’, a massive experiment by policymakers has seen an important part of it vindicated.

There were three countries or areas that adopted austerity in spades: the US, the UK and the Eurozone. Are any of these likely to recognise the error of their austerity ways anytime soon? The conventional wisdom is that this will happen in the US, but this is to confuse actions and the reasoning behind them. Any fiscal expansion in the US would not be for Keynesian reasons. This is partly for the obvious reason that interest rates are rising, and the central bank has shown no clear sign that they would not meet any further expansion with additional increases. There remains a clear and rather urgent need for a large increase in public investment financed by borrowing, but that seems unlikely to happen. What we are sure to get is tax cuts, particularly for the rich, because that is nowadays the main goal of Republican economic policy. Among Republicans, Keynesian economics remains the work of the devil.

In the UK there is also a desperate need for public investment. In addition, the NHS is crying out for a substantial tax financed fiscal expansion, which would help get interest rates off their lower bound. But UK policy makers only have one thing on their minds at the moment. It is Brexit at any cost. We know that because they show no interest in any other options. Right now God could reveal to climbers on Ben Nevis that Brexit would cost the average UK household 20% of their income, and policy would not change. [0] While some in the government may be tempted by fiscal expansion as a way to hide those costs, the Treasury seems to be keeping an iron grip on the purse strings. Never has the UK government seemed so politically secure, and never has it been further from sensible economics.

Not all of the Eurozone’s problems are due to a failure to recognise Keynesian macro. As Martin Sandbu argues here, what has been done and continues to be done to Greece is the age old story of the creditor refusing to admit that they have made bad loans, and therefore squeezing the debtor for every last drop and not realising that doing so only makes things worse. But even here a failure to understand Keynesian economics contributes to this lack of understanding. A country that is allowed to recover from a demand led recession will be far more able to find resources to pay back debt.

However if you look very hard there are signs that things might be improving in the Eurozone. Fiscal austerity at the aggregate level seems to have come to an end. Some key actors, even in EC institutions and governments, are beginning to see how austerity policies may only encourage the rise of the populist right. But that is a long way from the key reform that is required, which is replacing the existing fiscal architecture with something more Keynesian that recognises the mistakes of the past.

If anything is going to happen at all, I doubt if it will be the abandonment of the stability pact and fiscal compact, desirable though that would be. What seems more likely is a gradual adaptation of the mess that all these rules already are. The adaptation does not even need to look like Keynesian policy. National fiscal and macroprudential policies need to focus on inflation differentials between the individual country and the Eurozone average. This focus could be embodied in a rule, which still allowed debt or the deficit to be guided by a target when inflation was at the zone average. This rule has to be symmetric in inflation differentials, prescribing fiscal expansion if a country’s inflation is lower than average.

Equally disappointing has been the complacency of independent central banks. We have had the most prolonged recovery from recession, with lasting damage to long run supply, but you might be forgiven for thinking that we were still in the Great Moderation. Central banks should be busy comparing the four main ways of avoiding another Zero Lower Bound episode: a higher inflation target, negative nominal rates, nominal GDP targets or helicopter money. They also have to stop being so discreet about fiscal policy. Keeping quiet itself makes another ZLB episode more dangerous.

Occasionally people ask why my blogs seem to be as much about politics as economics these days. I agree, there has been a change since 2015. Before that, I would have greeted a new paper on fiscal multipliers by comparing it to the existing literature, and examining its strengths and weaknesses. These days there just seems so little point. I do hope all this knowledge will one day see the light of day among policymakers, but right now I wonder if there is an equally good chance that policy makers will stop paying for knowledge they have no intention of using. [1] Sometimes writing about the finer details of estimated multipliers can seem like rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic.

[0] Here are some man-made estimates

[1] U.S. U.K.

Reactionary Keynesianism

Under Donald Trump we might get what some have called Reactionary Keynesianism. But a stimulus is a stimulus, right, and for those of us who think most OECD economies should be ‘run hot’ to try and make up some of the ground still lost from the Great Recession any fiscal stimulus should be welcomed? So Martin Sandbu writes

“it is hypocritical of anyone to warn that Trump’s promised tax cuts will endanger the public finances if they called for fiscal stimulus under Obama and his putative Democratic successor. …. While the composition of tax cuts and spending increases may matter, the overall size of any deficit increase matters at least as much.”

If by this he means don’t worry too much about the composition, the overall size of the deficit is more important, I think this is terrible macroeconomics. It is foolish to believe that anything that raises the deficit will stimulate.

We know that a part of any Trump stimulus will be large tax breaks for the very rich. The very rich will almost certainly consume virtually none of this tax break in the short term. It is the one part of the population where Ricardian Equivalence almost holds. You might think that therefore it does at least do no harm to short term aggregate demand. But this could be wrong, because the logic of the intertemporal budget constraint still operates. Those tax cuts will not be paid for by higher activity in the short term, so they may mean higher taxes down the road. Now if people who are not very rich think that these might be their taxes that are increased down the road, they will reduce their consumption today. The net effect could be a drop in demand.

You may think that consumers may not be so foresighted, so demand will not actually fall. But the logic of the intertemporal budget constraint still holds. If tax cuts for the rich just raise the deficit with almost no short run demand boost, then that is a transfer to the rich today from the non-rich tomorrow. If tax cuts for the rich were paid for by tax increases on everyone else today many politicians would be up in arms. Delaying the tax increase on everyone else by borrowing is a trick that should be seen straight through.

Yet I fear this is still not the case, and talking about tax cuts for the rich as part of a stimulus just helps confuse politicians. Those on the right understand this: tax cuts for the rich are nearly always part of a general stimulus: when Nigel Lawson did this it helped bust the UK economy. We should just repeat again and again: tax cuts for the rich paid for by borrowing are really tax increases for everyone else.

The example of tax cuts for the rich is the example that refutes the general proposition that the composition of any fiscal stimulus matters less than the overall size of any increase in the deficit.

Trump has also said he wants more investment in public infrastructure. That is something the US desperately needs, but remember that Trump will usher in an era of crony capitalism and politics like never before. The infrastructure that you might get could be far from the infrastructure the US actually needs, and instead may be whatever buys votes or other kinds of deals that help a Trump administration. Now if that infrastructure was produced entirely by those who otherwise would be out of the workforce but would like the jobs involved, then aggregate welfare would still increase: it is Keynes’s famous digging holes example. But in practice that seems unlikely to be completely or even mainly true, and so these white elephants may in practice crowd out better projects. In that case US citizens would not be better off in the short term as a result of this fiscal stimulus, even if GDP did rise. And the stimulus would not pay for itself, so once again other people should worry about the government’s intertemporal budget constraint.

If the economics of Reactionary Keynesian is bad, I think the politics is even worse. Quite simply, by achieving very little beyond redistributing to the rich and unworthy, it gives Keynesian policy a bad name. But we can avoid that, when we can, by not calling every increase in the deficit a stimulus. And by saying tax cuts for the rich paid for by borrowing are really tax increases for everyone else.

The Autumn Statement marks the return of austerity

One of the problems with instant responses is that you miss the big picture. And although everything I wrote immediately after the Autumn Statement was perfectly correct, I too failed to spell out the big picture. The big picture is that austerity has returned. (Credit to Rick for a much better call.)

Let me explain. Unlike some, I do not just define austerity as fiscal consolidation or government spending cuts. Instead I define it as fiscal consolidation that creates an output gap. That should normally only happen for three reasons:

1. you are part of a monetary union (or fixed rate regime) and the rest of the union is not doing fiscal consolidation (as much).
   
   
2. if interest rates are stuck at their lower bound.
   
   
3. If the monetary authority is incompetent.

I believe it makes sense to define austerity that way, because only then does fiscal consolidation lead to a waste of aggregate resources.

A competent central bankers’ tell (as in poker) for being at the zero lower bound is that they embark on new Quantitative Easing (QE). Central bankers know that interest rates are a much more reliable instrument than QE, so expanding QE tells us we are at the lower bound as they see it. We also know that fiscal expansion is a more reliable instrument than QE. So if central banks are doing QE, it pretty well follows that we have austerity.

Now Hammond could have changed that on Wednesday by announcing a significant fiscal stimulus relative to previous plans. He did not. The increase in public investment, as I said in my previous post and the IFS confirms, was small, as were his other measures. This, as Martin Sandbu points out (who, naturally, also called it right), was a huge missed opportunity. Don’t get misled by actually borrowing levels to judge changes in fiscal stance: most of the additional borrowing was unintentional.

As I have tried to explain on many occasions, the nature of policy pre-Brexit was different from policy in 2010 and 2011. The later was austerity as I like to define it. The former was bad in many ways, one of which was to run the risk of more austerity if we had a negative demand shock. Brexit was a negative demand shock, and so we now have austerity, and Hammond did far too little to rectify his predecessors mistake.

So why did Hammond keep his squeeze on the public sector’s current spending largely unchanged (again, see my previous post for the relevant chart)? Why not give some money to the NHS? Perhaps he too wants to pursue deficit deceit: to shrink the state. Another possible reason is that the Treasury has persuaded him that he should not ‘take any risks’ with public debt. Let me end by saying a bit about that.

Another definition of austerity beside the two already mentioned is an economic policy that focuses above all else on the need to reduce government debt levels. That is the sense of austerity being used in this BBC piece. Needless to say I very much side with Jonathan Portes rather than Michael McMahon on this. But many journalists are puzzled nevertheless: what about all that stuff about the world falling in if debt to GDP reached 90% of GDP? At what level do those who buy UK government debt start to worry about default? I will talk about that tomorrow.

Greece under Troika rule

“The repayment of foreign loans and the return to stable currencies were recognized as the touchstones of rationality in politics; and no private suffering, no infringement of sovereignty was considered too great a sacrifice for the recovery of monetary integrity. The privations of the unemployed made jobless by deflation; the destitution of public servants dismissed without a pittance; even the relinquishment of national rights and the loss of constitutional liberties were judged a fair price to pay for the fulfilment of the requirements of sound budgets and sound currencies, these a priori of economic liberalism.”

Karl Polanyi (1944), “The Great Transformation” (p142)

This quote (HT Jeremy Smith) could almost be written today about Greece. I had once thought that the lessons of the interwar period and Great Depression had been well learnt, but 2010 austerity showed that was wrong. I therefore used in a 2014 post an earlier example of where one country allowed another to suffer for what was thought to be sound economics and their own ultimate good (‘a sharp but effectual remedy’): the British treatment of Ireland during the famine.

The British held back relief because of a combination of laissez-faire beliefs and prejudice against Irish catholics. Replace famine relief with debt relief and Irish operating an inefficient agricultural system with lazy Greeks and an economy in need of structural reform, and the two stories have strong similarities, although of course the scale of the suffering is different.

To understand why the Greek crisis goes on you need to understand its history. That the Greek government borrowed too much is generally agreed. What is often ignored is that the scale of the excess borrowing meant default was pretty inevitable. But Eurozone leaders, worried about their banking system (which held a lot of Greek debt), first postponed default and then made it partial. The real ‘bailing out’ was for the European banks and others who had lent to the Greek government. The money the Eurozone lent to Greece largely went to pay off Greece’s creditors.

There was absolutely nothing that obliged Eurozone leaders to lend their voters money to bail out these creditors. Pretty well all the analysis I saw at the time suggested it would be money that Greece would be unable to pay back. If European leaders felt their banking systems needed support, they could have done this directly. But instead they convinced themselves that Greece could pay them back. It was a mistake they will do anything to avoid admitting.

To try and ensure they got their money back, they along with the IMF effectively took over the running of the Greek economy. The result has been a complete disaster. The amount of austerity imposed caused great hardship, and crashed the economy. Whereas the Irish and Spanish economies are beginning to recover and regain market access, Greece is miles away from that, and the Troika’s structural reforms are partly to blame.

Austerity did achieve primary balance on the government’s accounts, which means that the government only needed to borrow to rollover existing debt. But the Troika wants 3.5% primary surpluses by 2018: they want to start getting their money back sooner rather than later. This was and is an absurd demand, and is quite likely to mean that the Troika gets less of their money back in the end. It is clearly preferable to allow the Greek economy to first recover, and then work out over what period debts could be repaid. Right now Greece needs more aggregate demand not structural reform, yet the Troika insists on taking more demand out of the economy.

The requests that the Syriza government made in 2015 were eminently reasonable, as my joint letter with Flassbeck, Piketty, Sachs and Rodrick explained. It was defeated by an exercise of raw political power: Germany and the ECB were prepared to expel Greece from the Eurozone. The Greek people were not going to be allowed to escape from the debtors prison of Troika rule. Greece is even excluded from the debt relief implied by the ECB’s quantitative easing.

Despite Martin Sandbu’s optimism, the recent deal is essentially more of the same. The IMF, which knows it makes no sense to ‘extend and pretend’, has again capitulated. The reaction to the IMF’s paper on neoliberalism has generally missed the key point. It is not fanciful to believe that the paper is directed at those within the IMF like Poul Thomsen, the head of their European department. Falling GDP will continue to be blamed on the Greek government, even without its former finance minister. Of course one day the Greek economy will recover, just as the Irish famine came to an end. But history, as taught in Britain as well as Ireland, does not remember the British troops guarding the shipments of grain leaving Ireland during the famine as heroic upholders of the rules of law and contract. Nor will it do the same for the members of the Troika that keep Greece in poverty.

Media, Economics and Brexit

Martin Sandbu at the FT says “It is now fair to say that the debate on the economics has been won by the Remain side.” He was of course talking about what the Bank of England said yesterday, rather than the 196 economists who signed our letter, but together they present an important test for the non-partisan media. The extreme difference between the amount of coverage the Bank got (blanket) and our letter got (practically zero) tells us something important about how media coverage works: the Bank is after all just a collection of economists. [1] (The list of those who signed our letter can be obtained from here.)

The media will not, of course, go as far as Martin and say the economic argument has been won. But what they can say is that all the leading economic institutions and the overwhelming majority of academic economists think that Brexit will involve significant short term and long term costs. That is now a statement of fact, which readers of some very non-partisan tabloids may not be aware of. My guess would be that there are at least 25 academic economists who think Brexit will involve significant costs compared to each one who thinks it will bring benefits. As I said here, that is as close to unanimity among economists as you will ever get. As it is a fact, saying that it appears to be so in no way breaches impartiality.

They could go further. The main response of the Leave campaign has been to say all economic forecasts are hopeless. They are no doubt referring to unconditional macro forecasts of the ‘what will growth be next year’ type. However the assessments made by all these economists and economic institutions are not unconditional forecasts, but conditional forecasts: what difference will Brexit make. They are much more reliable than unconditional forecasts. (This point can be got across with simple analogies: a doctor will tell you that being overweight increases the chance of a heart attack, but not when you will have one.)

So trying to discount the near universal assessment of economists by referring to macro forecasts either represents dangerous ignorance or deliberate obfuscation. But for those with little knowledge of these things, it is a deception that could work. Pointing out the difference does not breach impartiality, but informs the debate.

Brexit in the UK, and Trump in the US, represents a critical challenge to the ‘shape of the earth: views differ’ style of reporting. ‘Balance’ should never involve ignoring facts that are awkward for one side, or not challenging statements that are false. How many journalists (particularly political journalists) recognise this may determine two critical elections for both the UK and the whole world.

[1] Of course letters are not random samples, but it is not often you get letters from 170+ academic economists. The letter is important because academic economists are hardly part of the establishment, and indeed academics are usually able to say what they think without fear of any consequences.

Economists say no to Brexit

Today the Times has published a letter about Brexit. It is short and sweet.

Focusing entirely on the economics, we consider that it would be a major mistake for the UK to leave the European Union.

Leaving would entail significant long-term costs. The size of these costs would depend on the amount of control the UK chooses to exercise over such matters as free movement of labour, and the associated penalty it would pay in terms of access to the single market. The numbers calculated by the LSE’s Centre for Economic Performance, the OECD and the Treasury describe a plausible range for the scale of these costs.

The uncertainty over precisely what kind of relationship the UK would find itself in with the EU and the rest of the world would also weigh heavily for many years. In addition, there is a sizeable risk of a short-term shock to confidence if we were to see a Leave vote on June 23rd. The Bank of England has signalled this concern clearly, and we share it.

The simplicity of the letter was deliberate, as it was designed to show the extent of the consensus among economists on this issue. In a relatively short space of time Tony Yates, Paul Levine and I got 196 signatories, most of whom are UK academic economists. (The letter was originally intended just to focus on academic economists, but others wanted to sign.)

Why bother? After all doesn’t everyone already know that nearly all economists think Brexit would have significant costs? Only yesterday NIESR published their own estimates of costs, nicely summarised by Martin Sandbu. There are two important points here. First, a large section of the print media is committed to Brexit. Second, the BBC has pledged to be balanced, which means always matching stories about the economic cost with those who believe it will be a benefit.

Some may have noticed the disparity in the standing of those anti and pro Brexit, but equally others may have used attempts at balance to say to themselves that economists are always disagreeing and therefore dismiss warnings about costs. There are two reasons why you will never get unanimity from economists: it is a science about people and therefore inherently uncertain, and the views of a few economists are influenced by their politics. There is the joke that if you put 10 economists in a room you get 11 opinions. Which means that when all but a handful agree about something, you can be pretty sure the theory and evidence are strongly pointing in one direction.

There is therefore a huge disparity between the overwhelming majority of economists that say we would be worse off with Brexit and the handful that say otherwise. That is as near to unanimity among economists as you will ever get.

The Eurozone recovery

Which posted the strongest growth at the beginning of 2016: the US, UK or the Eurozone? The answer is the Eurozone. Growth at 0.6% for the quarter (about 2.5% at an annual rate) is nothing to write home about, but it is not the stuff of doom and gloom either. Reasonable growth like that should come as no surprise. The economy is receiving as much monetary stimulus as the ECB can currently muster, and fiscal contraction has come to a halt.

Inflation is still well below target, but the reason for that is straightforward enough (as Martin Sandbu points out): there is still a lot of spare capacity. Inflation will only stabilise at around the 2% target when that spare capacity has disappeared. Policy should be doing everything (more public investment!) to ensure that happens through strong growth rather than, as seems to have happened in the UK, a gradual contraction in supply. On inflation the ECB should make their target 2%, rather than the current ‘below but close to’ 2%, to avoid the Japan problem that Narayana Kocherlakota discusses here.

I went further when I wrote two weeks ago (the GDP figures came out a week ago) that “I also think we may see rapid Eurozone growth before [2020]”. By rapid growth I mean something in excess of 2.5%. I said that because I was adding one other factor into the mix of fiscal neutrality and monetary expansion, which is that the Euro has been pretty competitive for well over a year. As Martin points out, that has so far not contributed anything to recent Eurozone growth.

I have read in a few places recently people saying that the impact of international competitiveness is not what it was. I agree with Paul Krugman that this pessimism is unlikely to be warranted. I have spent a significant part of my working life estimating and applying trade elasticities (the impact of international competitiveness on trade and hence demand), and this experience has taught me that this effect is a bit like Milton Friedman’s description of how monetary policy works: there can be long and variable lags. So I expect that the Eurozone’s competitiveness gain over the last year and a half will begin to impact on Eurozone GDP at some point in the next year or two, and that might just provide more rapid growth than we saw at the beginning of 2016.

Central bank mistakes: more on count 2

Martin Sandbu in the FT picks up on my post on central bank mistakes. While he says that the first and third I identify are “on point”, he says the second is simply wrong. I think this is because he (and many others) misunderstand the point I am making, which in turn probably means I’ve failed to be clear about it. But it is really important.

My second criticism is that central banks did not make it clear what the impact of reaching the zero lower bound (ZLB) was, and as a result were too quiet about the adverse impact of fiscal austerity. That is not the same as saying there is nothing central banks can do at the ZLB, or that unconventional monetary policy is impotent. As I said in the post, what the ZLB meant is that central banks could no longer do their job effectively, and that unconventional policy “was untested, and it is just not responsible to pretend otherwise”.

Take three instruments: interest rate changes, fiscal policy changes, and unconventional monetary policy. The first two are tried and tested. There is still much uncertainty, but we can have a good guess at orders of magnitude when it comes to working out how much we need to do to achieve some end result (particularly when interest rate changes will not undo fiscal policy’s effects). Unconventional monetary policy has some impact, but we have little prior knowledge of how big that effect will be (or equivalently, how much we need to do to achieve some end result.) Given lags between instrument changes and results, this is a very serious disadvantage.

A simple analogy. The central heating is broken, and it is freezing outside. It can be fixed quickly with the right kit. You ring two plumbers to come and fix it. One says he can be there immediately, the other says they can come in two hours. You are getting very cold, so you naturally choose the plumber who can come straight away. However when they arrive, they tell you their equipment required to fix the problem quickly is broken, but they can nevertheless probably bodge something within the next day or two. You ring the other plumber, and they do have the right equipment. What would you do? Would you not get cross at the first plumber for not telling you their equipment was not working properly when you first contacted them? Now suppose the first plumber did not tell you anything, and you only found out about the kit that could have fixed the problem quickly later on. Would you employ that plumber again, particular when you discover that since his ‘repair’ your central heating is not working as well as it used to?

In a way this strikes at the core of the independence issue. Without independence, the government would be able to choose the best instrument available, which at the ZLB is fiscal policy. But central banks have been made independent and the task of stabilising the economy has been delegated to them. This institutional change should not mean that we no longer use the best instrument to do the job. [1] But if the central bank fails to be frank, perhaps because it feels bad about admitting that it no longer has the best tools to do the job, that is a clear mistake on its part. In this respect it is not important whether the central bank being honest and clear would have actually made a difference on this occasion. That it might have done is all that matters.

I think central banks can at this point get confused with political neutrality. But pointing out the facts as they see it about their own relative competence should never be seen as ‘political’. Here Tony Yates makes a good suggestion, which is that the central bank should be mandated to comment “on whether its ability to meet the inflation target [or whatever its objectives are] was being hampered by government fiscal policy.” 

Advocacy blogging is so ubiquitous that some presume that in pointing out this and other mistakes I must be arguing against central bank independence (CBI). To repeat, I am not. What I think is indisputable is that CBI done badly can be worse than no independence. It does not serve the cause of well designed and well implemented central bank independence to gloss over past mistakes.

[1] Suppose you erroneously think concerns about government debt were valid. Was that a justification for central bankers to argue against fiscal expansion? Absolutely not. With QE, any fiscal expansion could have been money financed. What central bankers should have said is that short term concerns about excessive government debt were unfounded, because they were acting as a lender of last resort. They did not say this.