Winner of the New Statesman SPERI Prize in Political Economy 2016
Showing posts with label IFS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IFS. Show all posts

Tuesday, 30 May 2017

Growth will be lower if the Conservatives win

The Conservatives want Brexit to be the central issue in this election. Partly as a result, the relative macroeconomic outlook under the different parties has not been discussed as much as it should, or as much as it was in 2015. The other reason it has not been discussed very much is that the economic record of the last seven years has been dire, but prospects under either Labour or the LibDems would be distinctly better. [1]

The last seven years have seen an extraordinary decline in real wages. To quote Rui Costa and Stephen Machin:
“Since the global financial crisis of 2007/08, workers’ real wages and family living standards in the UK have suffered to an extent unprecedented in modern history. Real wages of the typical (median) worker have fallen by almost 5% since 2008, while real family incomes for families of working age have just about recovered to pre-crisis levels.”

This stagnation in real wages is greater than any other advanced economy bar Greece. [2] In addition, as Laura Gardiner from the Resolution Foundation points out, current government policies imply the “biggest increase in inequality since Thatcher”. The less you earn, the more this government plans to take income away from you.

The Conservative response is to point to record levels of employment, and to keep saying ‘strong economy’. But these two apparently diverse developments, high employment and falling real wages, may be related in a very simple way: workers may have been forced to price themselves into jobs by keeping real wages low, or workers who might otherwise have retired are continuing to work to earn enough for their old age. When high employment is a symptom of no growth in living standards, it is nothing to cheer about. They both reflect a weak rather than a strong economy.

The different party manifestos have been discussed at length, but one aspect that has been almost totally ignored by the media has been their different macroeconomic implications. A lot of the responsibility for this lies with the IFS. As I wrote in a recent tweet, the “problem with IFS analysis of manifestos is not just the absence of macro dimension, but their failure to acknowledge it even exists.” **

Both the Labour and LibDem manifestos amount to an increase in public investment, and an increase in public spending financed by higher taxes, compared to current government plans. Standard macroeconomics implies that both higher investment and spending will lead to an increase in GDP, unless the Bank of England raises interest rates to exactly offset this effect. With interest rates currently stuck at their lower bound, and with public investment helping aggregate supply, that last possibility is extremely unlikely. The conclusion therefore has to be that GDP over the next few years would be higher under a Labour or LibDem government than under the Conservatives.

This is why, according to Larry Elliott, Oxford Economics estimate that “the economy would be 1.9% bigger under the Lib Dem plans and 1% bigger under Labour’s plans than under Conservative plans.” The argument that this cannot be done because it would involve some more borrowing is rightly dismissed as pre-Keynesian nonsense. It is for this reason that the IFS approach of ignoring macro is so helpful for the Conservatives. I understand that the IFS does not do macro, but its failure to even mention this gap in their analysis not only encourages mediamacro, but in the current situation represents a clear bias towards the Conservatives.

This is not the only reason why living standards would be significantly higher under a Labour/Lib Dem government. Just as the IFS ignores macro, I fear Theresa May ignores economics. In this post I noted her obstinate refusal to take foreign students out of their net migration target (causing considerable damage to one of our leading export industries), but more generally her obsession with reducing immigration is likely to do further damage not just to the public finances, but output and living standards too. It is increasingly clear that while the the coalition government (and in particular George Osborne) had no intention of meeting their immigration target, May regards it as an unfulfilled commitment despite the economic damage this would do. This marks a big difference between the Conservatives and Labour.

Finally, in comparing the economic outlook under a Conservative or alternative government, we should not ignore Brexit. After my previous post outlining why May is in many ways unsuited to the forthcoming EU negotiations, some comments were along the lines that surely Corbyn would be worse. I think not, for two reasons. You have to put out of your mind the government’s and media’s framing of these negotiations as some kind of poker game or battle of wills. They are much more like a cooperative exercise involving give and take. I see clear reasons for thinking that May/Davis will be worse at this than Corbyn/Starmer. Last but not least, I think there is no chance of a No Deal outcome under Labour, but a significant chance that the Conservatives would walk away. As Ben Chu points out, what is best for the UK economy might well be rather different from what Theresa May sees as best for Theresa May.

If the last 10 days of the campaign seem to ignore the outlook for the economy, there will be a very simple reason why. As a result of the manifestos, attitudes to immigration and Brexit, the UK economy will be better off and subject to less risk if Theresa May is no longer the Prime Minister after 8th June.


[1] Implicit in these two sentences is that the Conservatives tend to dictate the issues discussed by the media during an election, as was clearly the case in 2015.

[2] See also this New York Times piece from Simon Tilford, which presents a rounded picture of our performance relative to other European countries, rather than the carefully chosen snippets beloved by the government's spin machine.

** In the original version of this post I said that the IFS analysis assumes GDP would be fixed. This is incorrect: what I had missed is that they do allow a short term impact from additional public investment on GDP (see slide headed 'Impact on the Economy' here). However this slide illustrates exactly the concern I have.
(1) It makes no sense to allow a short term impact from public investment, but no short term impact from a balanced budget increase in public spending.
(2) The slide says that the long term positive impact of this public investment on GDP will be exactly offset by the macro impact of a higher minimum wage and additional public holidays. Is this a result of detailed macro analysis, or just a convenient assumption?
(3) The slide also says that the Conservative commitment to reduce immigration would weaken growth and public finances, but despite this they assume no impact of lower immigration on growth. This makes no sense whatsoever, unless we are working backwards from the fixed long run GDP assumption. 




Wednesday, 17 May 2017

But do the numbers add up?

The (official) launch of Labour’s manifesto saw mediamacro on display in all its unabashed pre-Keynesian ignorance. The idea that we could spend more on health and education by raising taxes on companies and high earners was so novel and (to many) attractive, the broadcast media collectively decided there had to be something wrong. The manifesto appeared to have increases in current spending exactly covered by increases in taxes, so surely there had to be some mistake.

Step forward the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS). Now I have huge respect for the IFS and the way it is run. Over the years it has established itself as the organisation of choice from where the media can get unbiased assessments of the size of individual fiscal measures or fiscal packages like budgets and election manifestos. But with this influence comes responsibility. Paul Johnson will freely admit that the IFS does not do macroeconomics. For many years before 2008 the IFS could get away with that, but no longer.

The IFS quite rightly said that tax estimates were uncertain because people can take measures to avoid tax increases or new taxes. The manifesto had made an allowance for this, but presumably the IFS thought it was not enough. In the media framing of measures having to ‘add up’ that suggested a potential problem with Labour’s figures. What the IFS did not say (or at least were not reported as saying) is that - when interest rates are at their lower bound - a tax funded spending increase would provide a much needed boost to activity, which itself would raise taxes. This is the famous balanced budget multiplier, which still holds in state of the art New Keynesian models when rates are stuck at their lower bound.

The IFS said raising corporation tax would cut investment, but did not note that raising demand would have the opposite effect. Because the IFS does not do macro, these points were simply not made. No one made the point that increasing public investment when real interest rates were about zero not only made good economic sense, but would also boost the economy, probably raise productivity, and itself bring in more taxes. In other words the IFS were implicitly assuming that this package would have no impact on output. [1] When interest rates are at their lower bound that is highly unlikely to be true. Even if interest rates did rise to exactly offset the demand impact of the balanced budget expansion, the increase in public investment will have positive supply side effects. I’m afraid this is a case where not doing macro means that what the IFS says is hopelessly one-sided. It has been 7 years since 2010, which is surely time enough to learn a bit of macro.

But this was nothing compared to media incredulity over failing to ‘cost’ the various nationalisation measures. Again the media have had years of being told that privatisation saves the government money, so surely reversing privatisations must cost them money. Of course neither is true in a macro sense. As any business will tell you, if you borrow to buy an asset, you get a return which should pay for the borrowing. When the government has no problem selling its debt at around zero real interest, the question ‘how much will it cost’ is completely irrelevant. The issue is whether this industry should be a private monopoly or state owned.

I should record two caveats to this familiar complaint about mediamacro in the coverage I saw. First, the BBC’s economics editor Kamal Ahmed did give a 30 second slot to someone from the IPPR, who very succinctly made the macroeconomics case for both a balanced budget spending increase and additional public investment. It was a single ray of sunshine in an otherwise dreary day. Second, senior Labour politicians still seem unable to robustly defend their own position on this. You don’t respond to questions about why nationalisations have not been costed by saying you do not know what the share price will be. You say as long as we pay a fair price it does not matter what it costs, because the state is buying an asset that brings a return that more than pays for the borrowing.

Of course journalists should ask hard questions at a time like this. I just wish they would not persist with questions which show their own macroeconomic ignorance. (It is a problem that arises with Budgets just as much as with election manifestos.) As any macroeconomist knows, there is no reason why the numbers have to add up, and if they didn’t on this occasion that is actually a benefit given rates are at their lower bound. The media’s focus on adding up misinforms viewers, and is classic mediamacro. As any economist knows if this government buys an asset by borrowing at zero real interest rates it really does not matter how much you have to borrow. Ask Labour politicians why they think the industry would be more efficiently run under public ownership, not how much will it cost.

But let me end on a positive note. It is great to finally have at least one of the two main parties putting the case for a large increase in public investment when the government’s borrowing costs are so low. It is great to see one party prepared to raise taxes to stop the growing squeeze on the NHS and the new squeeze on education. It is great that Labour have a fiscal rule which tries to represent current macroeconomic understanding rather than the wisdom of the Swabian housewife. Let’s hope this lasts beyond this election.

[1] In principle that could influence the ‘highest tax take since 1940s' line, but the impact on GDP would have to be quite large to do that. (HT GT) 

Tuesday, 8 November 2016

The benefit cap: more media driving policy

Yesterday I talked about how the media, and the right wing tabloid press in particular, plays a major role in determining not only government policy on immigration and the EU, but also determining the policy of the Labour opposition (on austerity, immigration and the EU). Yesterday also saw the introduction of a reduced benefit cap in the UK, which is another issue where both government and opposition policy has its origins in the tabloid press.

The benefit cap imposes a maximum figure you can receive in benefits (where benefits include child benefit). The previous cap hit around 20,000 households, mainly those with large numbers of children or paying very high London rents. (This and subsequent figures come from here.) The new lower cap will hit nearly 90,000, and its impact will be felt throughout the country. Those already capped will lose a further £3,000 per year (in London) or £6,000 per year (elsewhere). The government expects those households newly affected by the cap to lose an average of £2,000 a year.

The origin of this cap come from countless stories like this in the tabloid newspapers. Such stories, which are hardly ever contextualised in terms of how typical they might be, understandably annoy many people. As a result, the policy of a benefit cap has proved very popular. The government formalised motivation for the original cap with the idea that no one on benefits should receive more than they could by working. But as Declan Gaffney explained in this superb post:
“people are not generally better off on benefits than working: that’s the effect of having a minimum wage to which levels of in-work support (tax credits and housing benefit) are calibrated. As long as someone is working 16 hours a week at the legal minimum hourly wage, they are better off in work. So the principle that the public approves – the one they are in fact approving when they give their support to the cap- is already built into the social security system. But as the public is not generally familiar with the workings of the system (why should they be?), they are not necessarily aware of this.”

However the cap was quantified by comparing all the income of those out of work with just some of the income of those in work.
“So child benefit, child tax credit and housing benefit are included on one side of the comparison (out of work) and excluded on the other (working). You can demonstrate anything if you’re prepared to rig the comparison in this way, and that is precisely what the government has been doing.”

It is difficult to imagine any other motivation beside garnering popularity or appeasing the press for why the government introduced the benefit cap. The original cap raised relatively small amounts, but had a large negative impact on already poor children. The evidence suggests that only a very small percentage of those hit by the cap were encouraged to find work or move. But such was the popularity of the cap, that both the LibDems and Labour accepted it ‘in principle’. Gaffney’s post contains this very revealing quote from the LibDem Lord Kirkwood
“I want to make it clear that I am implacably opposed to a household benefit cap in principle. People's eyes glaze over when I try to explain my main reasons. I tried it in Grand Committee and by the end people looked at me as though I was possessed..... What I should really like to do with Clause 94 is vote against the whole thing. However, my noble friend Lord German and one or two others took me into a dark room, sat me down and said, "That wouldn't be sensible because the great British public know the square root of next to nothing at all about the detail of the technicalities". He has persuaded me that I should mitigate Clause 94, and I am prepared to do that.”

The benefit cap is also an example of where an opposition tactic of ‘accepting in principle’ but tinkering at the edges just becomes failed appeasement. Gaffney ends by saying: “there are costs attached to this strategy, in terms of the quality of political debate and more generally in the endorsement it gives to a big untruth about the social security system and those who are relying on it.” His post was written about the initial cap in 2012, and yesterday’s intensification of the policy suggests he was absolutely right. (Contrast with the bedroom tax, which Labour did oppose.) [1]

In 1966, Ken Loach made the television play Cathy Come Home about homelessness. In a small way it shocked the nation, by making many people aware of something that was otherwise unreported. Today what we have on television is Benefit Street. Ken Loach recently made the film I, Daniel Blake about the victims of the government’s benefit system which has helped create the huge expansion of food banks. But if the film was shown on TV today, I doubt whether it would have the same impact as Cathy Come Home. The idea that most benefit claimants are in some sense fake remains embedded in the public consciousness, and the belief is supported by the same media that initially helped create it. It is another politicised truth: a falsehood that politicians and the political media pretend is true.



 [1] The danger of conceding the principle can also be illustrated by austerity. Once you accept that the deficit is a problem that requires an immediate solution, there are no limits on how much austerity you have, as public credit will always go to those to try and solve the deficit problem quickly.

Saturday, 19 March 2016

Lack of accountability

In 2007 the Pitt review told us that climate change was going to greatly increase the incidence of record breaking bursts of rainfall in the UK. The Labour government responded by substantially increasing their spending on flood defences in the spending review which ended in 2010/11.

The coalition government reversed those increases, leading to sharp falls in spending on flood prevention. Five years and many costly floods later, George Osborne has finally admitted he was wrong by announcing a substantial increase in money for flood defences. After being told by the government, one flood disaster after another, that they were doing everything that was possible, they have now decided that maybe it would be a good idea to spend more.

A bigger mea culpa you could not find. Yet if you google “austerity flooding”, it is still my blog post that comes top. When the floods hit around Christmas in 2013, no one seemed to want to connect the two. The government seemed immune to criticism, and successfully directed any culpability to the Environment Agency (who could not answer back). Even with the latest floods, outside the pages of the Guardian or Independent there was little criticism of earlier spending decisions. Yes Labour were slow out of the blocks in attacking the government, but are we really in a media world where if a senior politician does not talk about something it becomes a non-subject?

Chris Dillow asks why Osborne is not given the scorn and derision he deserves. As ever he gives many possible answers, but to many people one factor above all explains what is going on. It can be summarised by the following chart from the IFS, looking at who wins and who loses from this latest budget.


As I noted in my last post, Osborne felt he had to produce a budget like this for reasons that have only to do with who will be the next leader of the Conservative Party. Yet many will conclude that he (almost) gets away with it because it is in the interests of those who control the media to let him get away with it.

While there is undoubtedly some truth in this, I do not think this is quite the killer explanation that some suppose. Another important factor is that we have been living through a period in which the need to cut spending to reduce the deficit has entered the national consciousness as not only an undeniable truth, but an imperative that dominated all other concerns. So strong was that conviction that it helped win the Conservatives an election, despite the fact that they pledged to make the deficit worse by cutting taxes. Osborne had successfully characterised himself as the politician brave enough to ‘make the hard choices’ required to fulfil that imperative.

But as I have argued before, this belief that what George did and continues to do on cuts is an undeniable necessity is a product of the events of the recent past, rather than some immutable idea that the nation will forever hold. The most significant part of Iain Duncan Smith’s resignation letter is the following:
“I am unable to watch passively whilst certain policies are enacted in order to meet the fiscal self-imposed restraints that I believe are more and more perceived as distinctly political rather than in the national economic interest.”

So a plea to political journalists and commentators. Forget the spin that this resignation is all about the EU referendum (which, like all good spin, has an element of truth) and focus on this sentence. The idea that with his cuts George was and is only doing what had and has to be done is crumbling, and you do not want to be the last to notice. Start holding our government to account, not just for benefits cuts but also for the damage caused by flooding, and above all for the dire performance of the UK economy relative to the past.