Should we demand ‘fully costed’ programmes?

Chris Dillow says we should not, and indeed that journalists who constantly ask ‘where is the money coming from’ are pandering to the idea that the height of economic competence for any government is to balance the books. I think his argument makes some good points, but taken at face value it is untenable.

To see why it is untenable, imagine a political party that promised to increase public spending, cut taxes, cut back on borrowing and let the central bank control inflation. Should journalists simply let that pass, as if the government budget constraint no longer existed?

You could respond by saying that a government that promised the earth would obviously not be credible. The problem with that argument is that a majority of the British people recently voted for a plan that would damage trade with our largest trading partner and most of that majority still believed they would be no worse off as a result. It is part of a journalist’s job to remind the public that basic trade-offs and constraints exist.

But I think Chris is right about individual policy measures. It makes little sense to require that each item of addition spending is matched to a measure to raise additional revenue, because this is not how fiscal policy actually works in any country. Whether all taxes should be tied to particular items of spending (hypothecation) is an interesting issue well beyond the scope of this post. Given this is not how current fiscal systems work, journalists and politicians should not encourage a belief that it is.

But if Chris is right about individual policy measures, when do we get the discussion of the overall fiscal picture that I argue is necessary? The answer is a simple demarcation. If an individual spending minister or shadow minister is proposing a particular measure, don’t ask them how it will be paid for. Instead ask them whether that measure makes sense on its own merits, and why doing something else within that minister’s remit would not be more preferable. For example ask an education minister whether it wouldn’t be better to avoid coming cuts to school budgets rather than spending money on grammar schools or cutting tuition fees.

On the other hand, if the actual or potential Chancellor is being questioned, it makes sense to ask whether the programme as a whole would increase or decrease borrowing. Chris is right that all a Chancellor can do is plan for a particular level of borrowing, but that alone is insufficient grounds for not asking about their plans. Instead what it suggests is a good line of questioning for journalists: if the deficit unexpectedly increases/decreases what would you do? With any luck that sort of discussion could involve some macroeconomics that went beyond bookkeeping.

It is here that we can judge macroeconomic competency. In the current context, for example, any politician that fails to note that we are in a liquidity trap (interest rates are close to their floor and the central bank is increasing the extent of its unconventional monetary policy) and that therefore some temporary borrowing on current account would be a good thing is either not competent or is for some other reason still attached to austerity. Any politician that says we must target the overall deficit rather than the current deficit and thereby hold back public investment despite real interest rates being approximately zero is not competent.

A really intelligent way of helping the electorate judge these issues during elections is to enable the OBR to cost the programmes of the main political parties, as the Netherland’s fiscal council does. All it would need is a modest increase in resources for the OBR, which would be a small price to pay to improve the level of public debate. Ed Balls asked for that in 2015, but Osborne refused. It was typically short sighted, because at the same time he could have given them the remit to cost the implications of leaving the EU. That would have allowed the OBR to tell us that Brexit would cost the government around £15 billion a year (Table B1) before rather than after the vote. If the assessment of the economic costs of Brexit had come from the independent OBR rather than the Treasury, that alone might have been enough to change the result.

Does free movement really enable a low wage economy?

Tom Kibasi writes

“Immigration is such an important issue precisely because free movement of labour is the crucial enabler of the low skill, low productivity, low wage economic model that has been imposed on much of the country.”

This line may be very attractive to the liberal left: it gets to love immigration controls and can begin again to represent the part of working class that dislikes immigration. 

The reasoning is attractive. Starve firms of cheap labour, and they are forced to innovate and invest in labour saving machinery and/or in training their workers, which drives up productivity and real wages. In a world where capital is not mobile, that mechanism could work over a very long time period. But when capital is mobile, the firm has an obvious alternative: produce somewhere else where labour is cheaper. Keynes taught us not to make the mistake of assuming output was fixed, and the same is true here. Labour shortages could equally lead to less production, more imports, and a depreciation that makes everyone poorer.

Chris Dillow talked about these issues some time ago. He wrote

“The answer to this set of problems is to increase workers’ bargaining power – which requires, among other things, policies such as stronger aggregate demand and greater redistribution.”

Chris is right. If wages are low because of immigration, that will also mean that wages are unlikely to rise if demand expands. That in turn reduces the level of unemployment at which inflation is stable, allowing stronger aggregate demand and higher output. It is this additional demand that will allow firms to invest in more productive techniques, driving up productivity and real wages.

The endogeneity of aggregate demand and therefore output is key here. We could argue about whether labour shortages would be more likely to encourage firms to invest in labour saving machinery or move production abroad. But there is a third option which can achieve higher investment without running the risk of firms going overseas, and that is to expand demand. At the end of the day the only constraint on demand expansion is inflation, and if immigration is holding back wages it will also hold back inflation. We should not base policy on the assumption that governments undertake unnecessary austerity or central banks make deflationary mistakes. [1]

The link with austerity is even clearer when Kibasi writes

“What’s more, there is nothing progressive about declining to invest in skills in this country, while plundering poor countries of nurses or doctors or carers and then approaching immigration as if people were commodities to be bought up on the open market.”

This makes exactly the mistake that right wing newspapers have encouraged voters to make, which is to confuse the symptom for the cause. It is not private sector firms that have failed to invest in training nurses or doctors, but the public sector, most recently because of continuing austerity. Once again, what would be the consequence of cutting the immigration option? More money spent on the NHS, or a smaller NHS? It seems bizarre to argue that immigration enabled austerity, and that therefore EU immigration should be controlled. [2]

There is no evidence that immigration has in practice had any significant (in term of magnitude) impact on real wages. The trend in UK GDP per head had remained remarkably constant until the global financial crisis, despite periods of low or high immigration. The initial years of A8 EU immigration showed no fall in average earnings growth, with real wages continuing to rise. What we do know is that immigration helps the public finances, which means reducing it will mean either lower spending per head on public services like the NHS or require higher taxes. 

This point about public services illustrates the real problem with how the government dealt with A8 immigrants. As Nicholas Watt and Patrick Wintour relate, it was not a problem of poor forecasts: the forecasts were not bad once you factored in that Germany would impose transitional controls. It was a problem that the migration was concentrated in particular areas or towns, and nothing was done by government in response. So these towns saw greater pressure on public services, while the taxes immigrants paid went to the Treasury in London.

The data suggests that people in the UK have always favoured lower immigration. I suspect this is similar to questions like ‘do you favour lower taxes’: faced with something that naturally raises questions and concerns, it appears most people would rather have less of it. What began to happen at the beginning of the century is voters started saying that immigration was a key issue, alongside the economy or the NHS. This rise predates A8 immigration, and is strongly correlated with concern over defence/terrorism until 2008.

In truth, immigration is too tempting for some politicians and the media. As Tim Bale reminds us, the Tory opposition quickly started talking about Britain becoming a ‘foreign land’ after Labour was elected. Stories about benefit tourism play upon existing fears, and when politicians join in they appear to validate the problem. If that happens voters can easily turn their concerns about real wages or public services into concern about immigration, erroneously believing that immigrants are the underlying cause. So when austerity began, the government exploited these associations and the media either led or played along. If spending on the NHS was being ‘protected’, what else could rising waiting times be due to other than immigration? As concern about the NHS rose, so did concern about immigration. The truth was that the NHS was not being protected, but that truth was hard to find. 

The coup de grace of this strategy was to then associate immigration with the EU, which until the beginning of 2016 had been way down the list of popular concerns. Leavers managed to convince voters that reducing immigration required leaving the EU, even though non-EU immigration remained as high as EU immigration. The Prime Minister and Chancellor, having both pretended that immigration was a major problem, could not turn around and start singing its virtues. In that sense austerity beget Brexit.

As the referendum shows, no good comes from a strategy of using immigration as a scapegoat. The obvious way of handling such a close referendum vote would have been to leave the EU but stay in the single market. But by electing a Prime Minister who had spent 6 years trying and failing to reduce immigration, that option was ruled out because it would preserve free movement. EU immigration may fall anyway as a result of the Brexit and the depreciation it has caused, but beyond that it will be difficult for the government to reduce it further without hitting businesses at a very difficult time.

You do not kill immigration as an issue by talking about British jobs for British workers, still less by pretending that low wage jobs and a decade where GDP per head has hardly increased is the fault of immigration. As I argued here, to allow policy to be dictated by popular concerns risks making exactly the same mistake of those on the left who wanted to embrace austerity, although as I also noted popular concern is more deep rooted in the case of immigration. For that reason, turning the tide on attitudes to immigration will need much more than just facts and figures.

Although that task may seem daunting now, in five years or so it is likely to seem much easier. The chances are we will have left the EU, and the benefits that so many expect in terms of their access to public services or their real wage will not materialize. Either the government will avoid bringing immigration down, or if immigration does fall no obvious benefits will follow and there will be plenty of stories of firms suffering from labour shortages and leaving to produce elsewhere. Arguing then that lower immigration will usher in a period of high wage jobs will seem even more far fetched than it does now.

[1] A point that opponents of immigration often make is that immigration puts upward pressure on house prices. If there is no constraint on building houses, that in itself is no problem, just as it is no problem that immigrants will need refrigerators or cars. Those who argue that the country is full up have obviously never been to Scotland. Of course it may be a problem that most immigrants will go to English cities rather than Scotland, but that is again an existing problem of regional or industrial strategy which can and should be solved.

[2] The language of ‘people as commodities to be bought up on the open market’ is really too much. Are people in Poland forced to go and work in the UK? Of course not. They choose to do so, and most are better off as a result. If you want to be emotive then be accurate, and talk about how immigration controls cut off the chance of potential immigrants making a better life for themselves. 

Is austerity to blame for Brexit?

Mark Blyth writes

“Strip away all the electoral politics at the moment in the U.S., the U.K., Italy, Spain and elsewhere, and that's the underlying political economy. It's a creditor/debtor stand-off where the creditors have the whip hand. And yet, the more they crack the whip, the more the backlash against austerity, in all its forms, gains strength.”

Or in other words, it is all about austerity. That is a big claim, particularly when applied to the current US elections, but I want to examine it in the specific case of the EU referendum. In short, did austerity cause Brexit? Given how opposition to austerity has been such an important part of this blog, in some ways it is an attractive line for me to take, but I do try and base what I say on evidence rather than on what is convenient.

In the past I’ve argued that there is a massive problem with this idea, and the related idea that Brexit was a more general protest vote against elites. The obvious time to protest against austerity was the 2015 General Election. Yet rather than protest against the party that introduced austerity and promised much more of it, the British people gave the Conservatives a surprise victory.

It is nevertheless possible to argue that austerity caused Brexit in more subtle ways. I’ve also argued in the past that some of the concern over immigration is actually the result over concern about reduced public services and low wages, and a belief that the issues are linked. To the extent that reduced access to public services and to some extent low wages is actually the result of austerity, and if much of the public believe that austerity is nevertheless necessary, then what should be a protest over austerity could get displaced as a protest about immigration.

If your response to this idea is to say that concern over immigration is also a result of racism and xenophobia, I would agree, but argue that this is beside the point. When talking about the Brexit vote, we should be concerned about what you might call the swing voters, a point that Chris Dillow also makes. Remember that a large number of those voting Leave would not have been prepared to pay anything to reduce immigration: they do not sound like voters whose overriding concern is to see less foreigners on their streets. It is the Brexit voters who thought Brexit would make them better off that we should be concerned about.

So there is a possible mechanism by which austerity could have caused Brexit. That mechanism is part of a more general phenomenon: when things get tough, people become much more receptive to potential unfairness. It is what helps drive a belief that welfare goes to scroungers, a belief that some Conservative ministers seem happy to encourage.

Is there any evidence to support the idea that the mechanism I’ve outlined was important? Here is polling on the EU referendum over a long time period (source).

If there is a general recession effect here (i.e. applying to every UK recession) it is masked by other factors. However after the global financial crisis and austerity we did see a big shift against the EU, although that could also be explained by the Eurozone crisis. The drop in support for leaving before the 2015 election seems to go against the austerity caused Brexit hypothesis, but that was also a time the government and much of the media was claiming that the UK economy was recovering strongly. The true state of the NHS only became apparent to most people after the election, when support for Leaving revived. So I do not think this historical evidence is conclusive either way.

There is some econometric evidence for a link between the extent of public service cutbacks and the proportion of people voting Leave (for a summary, see this VoxEU article). But as the article itself notes, the measure of austerity used could simply be acting as a proxy for more long term deprivation, which is a widely acknowledged influence on Brexit.

In my view more compelling evidence for an impact of austerity on the Leave vote comes from the little polling evidence we have on why people think high levels of EU immigration is a problem. Here is the result of a poll on this that I have reproduced before, which speaks for itself.

As I have argued here, the current squeeze on the NHS is unprecedented. The share of NHS spending in GDP has a natural tendency to rise over time, for reasons that are well understood. Yet not only did few in the media contest the ‘common sense’ idea that austerity was necessary, but also voters hear time and again that NHS spending is being protected. As they see services deteriorate, it is not surprising that they conclude that there is just too much demand. I doubt very much that it is coincidence that the Leave campaign’s bus had the £350 million a week going to the NHS.

So there is evidence that links austerity to the Brexit vote, particularly if we remember we are not talking about a core vote that would have voted Leave anyway (because of xenophobia, for example), but the swing voters who at other times and circumstances might have voted the other way. But what about arguments that the Leave vote reflected a reaction to deprivation caused by globalisation, or that it was the result of the malign influence of the tabloid press? (I’ve made both arguments in the past.)

There is some complementarity here. As I noted at the beginning, the media is important in transforming concern about austerity from the politicians that impose it into concern about immigration. More importantly, there is no need to find the cause of Brexit. It seems quite possible to believe that the vote would have gone the other way if we had not had austerity, or if we had a tabloid press that was not just a cheerleader for Leave and a broadcast media indifferent to expertise, or if the impact of globalisation had been offset in various ways. With the vote so close, it is legitimate to argue that all three on their own might have been responsible for Brexit, or equivalently that the Brexit result was a consequence of a perfect storm of bad policies and institutions.